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Abstract 
Marching Orders? U.S. Party Platforms and Legislative Agenda Setting 1948-
2014 
Edward James Fagan, MA 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
Supervisor:  Bryan D. Jones 
What is the relationship between the priorities expressed in party platforms before an election 
and the subsequent legislative agenda? The agenda setting literature often deemphasizes the role 
of political parties in agenda setting. However, parties will often express different issue priorities 
during elections, and compete based on those priorities. The paper utilizes new data from the 
U.S. Policy Agendas Project and Wolbrecht (2016) on policy attention in U.S. party platforms to 
study the relationship between U.S. parties and legislative activities in Congress. A time series 
cross sectional analysis finds strong evidence to support the proposition that legislative agendas 
are influenced by the platform of the President’s party in the short term, although the relationship 
differs for different types of agendas and by issue, and fades over time.  
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In legislatures, “the most important part of the legislative decision process was the 
decision about which decision to consider.” (Bauer, Poole and Dexter 1963, 405) However, the 
agenda setting literature has generally minimized the role of political parties in setting the agenda 
for legislatures (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Given the importance of agenda setting in the 
policy process, the absence of political parties from determining the priorities of legislatures in 
troublesome. During elections, parties make appeals to voters both by taking positions on public 
policy and by selectively emphasizing issues (Egan 2013: Petrocik 1996). If parties in 
governments don’t represent these promised priorities, then the electoral conflict between parties 
does not structure political conflict in government over agendas.  
This paper argues that political parties in the United States are able to contribute to 
agenda setting, but their impact varies by type of agenda and timing. Policy areas emphasized in 
the platform of the President’s party can predict issues emphasized in Congress, but only 
immediately after the Presidential election. In the Second Congress after the election, the 
opposition party may have some agenda setting power. The relationship between the platform 
and the Congressional agenda varies by issue, agenda type, and whether or not government is 
unified. Under divided government, Congress holds more roll call votes on their prioritized 
issues. Under unified government, Congress holds more referral hearings.   
The paper proceeds as follows. In part one, I lay out a general theory of agenda setting 
and political parties. In part two, I apply that general theory of agenda setting and political 
parties to the U.S. system. In part three, I build a time series cross sectional model using data on 
U.S. roll call votes, referral hearings, non-referral oversight hearings and party platforms from 
1948-2014. In part four, I present the results of the model, finding strong evidence to suggest that 
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parties can contribute to agenda setting, and highlight interesting cross-sectional variation. In 
part five, I conclude. 
Agenda Setting and Political Party Platforms 
 
A necessary first step for government to make policy is to decide what issues will receive 
attention from policymakers (Arrow 1951). Attention is a scarce resource; policymakers and 
their staff can only move on a few of thousands of possible issues at any given time. The process 
of prioritizing decisions is called agenda setting (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Given that most 
salient issues are what Egan (2013) labels “consensus issues”, where all citizens and elites would 
prefer an outcome ceteris paribus, information about the priorities of policymakers is often more 
important to voters than information about their outcome preferences. Attention scarcity forces a 
choice between these consensus issues (Mayhew 2006). If voters observe differences in the 
priorities of political parties during elections, they can choose between two different sets of 
outcomes.   
However, recent agenda setting scholarship has traditionally deemphasized the role of 
political parties in agenda setting. Priorities are largely set by the problem space, moderated by 
institutional friction (Bevan and Jennings 2014; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Jones, Larsen-
Price and Wilkerson 2009; Sulkin 2005). Government attention lurches from problem to 
problem, leaving little discretion for individual actors to prioritize problems in advance. The 
literature suggests that both parties will weigh in on issues thrust on to the national agenda by 
circumstances in society. Often, they may apply very different solutions for those same 
problems, as processes prioritizing problems and generating solutions tend to operate 
independently (Cohen, March and Olson 1972, Kingdon 1984), but the forces that push 
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policymakers of one party to address an issue will push policymakers of other parties to do the 
same.  
Party agendas can be divided into a promissory agenda pledged by the party before the 
election and the anticipatory agenda reaction to new information when in government (Froio, 
Bevan and Jennings 2016; Mansbridge 2003). Punctuated Equilibrium Theory suggests that the 
anticipatory agenda should carry more weight, as policymakers shift their limited attention 
capacity to the most pressing problems at any given time (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). 
Government will decide that the most pressing problems are ones where the most errors have 
accumulated, rather than the ones highlighted by partisans during electoral campaigns (Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005). Voters expect their representatives to solve their problems, and hold them 
accountable when they fail to do so (Adler and Wilkerson 2012). Froio, Bevan and Jennings 
(2016) find at best a very weak relationship between the promissory agenda of the majority party 
and legislative outputs in the United Kingdom; instead they find that policymakers are much 
more likely to react to newly emergent information after elections. These systems are not 
unresponsive, as the public signal a “public agenda” to policymakers about which problems must 
be addressed (Jones and Baumgartner 2004), but the responsive process occurs in between 
elections, rather than directly in response to elections.  
However, this model of agenda setting conflicts with both positive and normative 
theories of political parties, legislative agenda setting and democracy. Parties serve as the 
primary structure for political conflict in a democratic society (Schattschneider 1942). We expect 
responsible political parties to take positions during elections and try their best to enact those 
positions if put into power (APSA 1950). Once in government, legislative parties have the means 
to control information (Curry 2015), sanction members and set the agenda in Congress (Cox and 
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McCubbins 2005), and exert negative agenda control (Gailmard and Jenkins 2007). Given the 
importance of agenda setting and issue prioritization in the policy process, voters should be able 
to choose between different sets of priorities for governing attention during elections. Political 
parties should play an important role in issue prioritization. 
Indeed, there is evidence that voters do make electoral decisions based on their 
expectations of party issue priorities. Petrocik’s (1996) issue ownership concept argues that 
voters will often choose candidates based on party reputations for the most salient issues at a 
given time (see also Petrocik, Benoit and Hansen 2003). Egan (2013) finds that these reputations 
are formed not by past performance on issues, but by voter judgments about the issues that 
parties deeply prioritize in the long term. Elected officials in each party tend to have similar 
“chief motivations for seeking power” (Egan 2013, 213), which voters are able to learn.  Parties 
increasingly compete by emphasizing issue priorities, rather than spatial positioning (Hofferbert 
and Budge 1992; Green-Pederson 2007).  
Scholars have also found some evidence party manifestos impacting legislative agendas 
in proportional representation systems. Issue attention from government increases as issue 
attention in manifestos increases in France and Belgium (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2014; 
Guinaudeau et al. forthcoming; Walgrave, Varone and Dumont 2005), but only under certain 
conditions. Coalitions in government will prioritize the issues of the party bloc in Denmark 
(Green-Pederson and Mortensen 2014). Opposition parties may have considerable agenda setting 
power, even in parliamentary settings where they have little formal power in the legislature 
(Sulkin 2005; Green-Pederson and Mortenson 2010).  
I argue that parties are torn between wanting to follow through with their campaign 
promises and enact their chief motivations for seeking power, and being pulled toward present-
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day demands of the anticipatory agenda. If all else were equal, parties would prioritize 
policymaking in the areas which they told voters they would prioritize if elected to power. These 
well-laid plans frequently do not survive contact with the constantly changing problem space, but 
some do. Policymakers must also devote considerable attention to the basic unchanging tasks of 
maintaining policy subsystems, leaving only a fraction of their policy attention available for 
discretionary action. 
 
Legislative Agenda Setting in the United States and Party Platforms 
 
In this next section, I apply the general theory of party platforms and agenda setting to 
agenda setting processes of the U.S. Congress given its institutional characteristics. In a unitary 
parliamentary democracy, the causal relationship between party platform and legislative outputs 
can be clearly observable. In the U.S. presidential system, the causal relationship is more 
complicated. U.S. party platforms are drafted and presented in the context of presidential 
nomination conventions; national parties do not create formal platforms for off year elections. 
The platforms are largely written as campaign documents by the party’s presidential campaign, 
rather than the direct result of intraparty political conflict (Maisel 1993). Thus, we should 
understand U.S. party platforms to represent the potential President’s promises more than the 
party’s platform generally. At the same time, platforms make broad legislative proposals, which 
the President does not have the power to directly implement.  
Like any other organization, legislatures must choose which problems to devote their 
scarce resources to. Many issues, such as expiring or annual legislation, require regular attention 
from legislators, while others are discretionary (Walker 1977; Adler and Wilkerson 2012). Often, 
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exogenous events will turn discretionary problems into mandatory problems (Adler and 
Wilkerson 2012). Thus, legislators often have limited capacity to devote attention to solving 
discretionary problems that they promised to address during campaigns. Legislatures expand 
their agenda capacity by delegating responsibility and authority to committees, each acting 
somewhat independently (Adler and Wilkerson 2012, Jones 2001). Committees are able to 
prioritize, gather information, draft legislation, and conduct oversight somewhat independently. 
However, the floor of Congress still acts as a bottleneck, where only a limited number of 
legislative priorities can receive consideration (Lewallen 2016). 
Presidents play a strong role in Congressional agenda setting. Executive offices serve 
often serve as a focal point of action and attention (Dahl 1960). U.S. Presidents, especially 
popular ones, have some ability to push certain issues on to the Congressional agenda 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Beckman 2010; Edwards and Wood 1999; Kernell 1997; Kingdon 
1995; Lee 2009; Lovett, Bevan and Baumgartner 2015). The effect is strongest for co-partisans 
and at the early stages of the legislative process (Beckman 2010). Therefore, Presidents should 
be able to push Congress to emphasize the priorities expressed in their platform, especially under 
unified government. 
Congress has two primary channels to affect public policy: oversight of the bureaucracy 
and statutory changes through legislation (Bawn 1997; Lewallen 2016; Talbert, Jones and 
Baumgartner 1995). Oversight allows committees to direct bureaucratic attention toward 
particular problems or solutions, using their authority over budgets to threaten bureaucrats who 
do not follow their instructions (Fenno 1973; Redford 1969). While Congress can make small 
changes to policy outputs using oversight, most oversight involves the maintenance of 
subsystems, and does not require much attention from the floor of Congress. Larger policy 
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changes normally require legislation, and thus are constrained by the bottleneck of attention at 
the floor (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Lewallen 2016). Party platforms promise large-scale 
change, as there is little reward to making low salience, status quo promises in an election. If 
attention to issues in party platforms can predict attention to issues in Congress after the election, 
we should expect the effect to be stronger for lawmaking attention than oversight attention. 
 We should also expect the agenda setting impact of party platforms to fade over time. 
U.S. party platforms are drafted every four years. In between two types of intervening events 
occur. First, the problem space changes. Issues that were important during the summer before the 
election compete with new issues that pop up. For example, the 2008 party platforms were 
released just weeks before the financial crisis began in earnest with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and subsequent worldwide recession. The subsequent Congress was forced to devote a 
large percentage of its attention toward responding to the crisis. Second, midterm elections bring 
a different set of promises and priorities, and may even change partisan control of the legislature.  
Overall, the relevance of the promissory agenda expressed in the party platform should decrease 
as time progresses. 
 From this theory, we can derive the following hypotheses: 
 Lawmaking Hypothesis: Issues emphasized in the platform of the President’s party will 
be more emphasized in the Congressional lawmaking agenda in the first Congress after the 
Presidential election. 
Oversight Hypothesis: Issues emphasized in the platform of the President’s party will be 
less likely to be emphasized in the Congressional oversight agenda than lawmaking in the first 
Congress after the Presidential election. 
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Fading Effect Hypothesis: Issues emphasized in the platform of the President’s party 
will not be more emphasized in either Congressional agenda in the second Congress after the 
Presidential election.  
Unified Hypothesis: The effect of issue emphasis in the platform on both the lawmaking 
and oversight agendas will be stronger under unified government. 
 Anticipation Hypothesis: Problems that are emphasized in the problem space will be 
emphasized in both the Congressional oversight and lawmaking agendas. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
 To test these hypotheses, I analyze the policy topics addressed by both Congress and 
party platforms from 1948-2014. All data is drawn from the Policy Agendas Project, which 
categorizes the policy content of outputs into one of twenty1 major topic areas, such as 
macroeconomics, environmental policy, or defense. Table 1 shows the twenty topics of the 
Policy Agendas Project, and the distribution of attention to these topics in all of the data used in 
this manuscript.  
I use an autoregressive distributed lag time series cross sectional design. This design has 
been used by recent scholars studying the agenda setting impact of executive speeches (Lovett, 
Bevan and Baumgartner 2015), parliamentary questioning (Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2011) and 
party platforms (Froio, Bevan and Jennings 2016; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010) on 
                                                
1	Observations	coded	as	government	operations	were	dropped	from	the	models	presented	in	
the	main	body	of	this	paper.	Government	operations	observations	include	a	large	number	of	
cases	with	little	to	no	policy	content	relevant	to	party	platforms,	such	as	procedural	votes,	all	
nominations	regardless	of	agency,	and	commemorative	laws.	Models	including	government	
operations	are	presented	in	Appendix	tables	1-2.		
 9 
legislative outputs. The unit of analysis is one topic; the time variable is one Congress. The 
national U.S. political parties released seventeen party platforms, one every four years just before 
Presidential elections, during this time period2. I model each new platform as a shock, and 
estimate the relationship between an issue receiving more or less emphasis in the platform and 
attention to the same issue in the subsequent Congress. All models contain panel corrected 
standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995).  All variables are expressed as a percent of policy 
attention.
                                                
2	Data	is	not	yet	available	for	the	114th	Congress	(2015-2016),	so	the	model	presented	for	the	
second	Congress	after	a	Presidential	election	contains	only	16	platforms.		
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Table	1:	Average	distribution	of	attention	to	issues			
Policy	Agendas	Project	
Major	Topic	Area	
Platform	
Attention1	
Roll	Call	
Attention	
	Referral	
Hearings	
Non-
Referral	
Hearings	
Most	
Important	
Problem2	
Agriculture	 3.5%	 4.5%	 3.6%	 3.6%	 0.4%	
Civil	Rights		 6.3%	 4.2%	 2.6%	 4.2%	 8.3%	
Defense	 9.9%	 10.9%	 9.6%	 12.0%	 15.0%	
Education	 4.7%	 3.1%	 2.4%	 1.8%	 1.9%	
Energy	 2.7%	 3.6%	 4.2%	 4.6%	 1.8%	
Environment	 2.6%	 2.3%	 4.7%	 3.5%	 1.0%	
Finance	and	Commerce	 2.5%	 4.2%	 8.8%	 8.1%	 0.2%	
Foreign	Affairs	 16.1%	 8.5%	 4.1%	 8.4%	 9.4%	
Government	Operations3	 5.4%	 21.1%	 14.1%	 16.7%	 3.9%	
Health	Care	 4.8%	 3.2%	 4.4%	 5.8%	 3.9%	
Housing	 3.3%	 2.8%	 2.1%	 2.2%	 0.3%	
Immigration	 1.2%	 1.0%	 1.0%	 1.0%	 1.0%	
Labor	 4.2%	 4.1%	 3.8%	 2.8%	 1.0%	
Law	and	Crime	 5.3%	 3.5%	 5.1%	 4.1%	 7.4%	
Macroeconomics	 14.6%	 6.5%	 2.4%	 3.9%	 31.2%	
Public	Lands	 3.8%	 5.2%	 16.3%	 5.0%	 0%	
Science	and	Technology	 1.4%	 1.9%	 3.0%	 3.6%	 0.2%	
Social	Welfare	 3.6%	 2.7%	 1.3%	 2.3%	 3.5%	
Trade	 2.2%	 2.3%	 1.9%	 2.5%	 0.3%	
Transportation	 1.6%	 4.3%	 5.1%	 4.2%	 0%	
1 Average of both platforms. 
2 Some MIP responses are coded “Don’t Know/Other.” As a result, this column does not sum to 
1.  
3Government operations policy has been dropped from the models presented in the main body of 
the paper. As a result, these percentages do not sum to 1. See footnote 1. 
 
For each dependent variable, I ran two models. The first predicts the Congressional 
agenda at time t, the first Congress after the Presidential election. The second predicts the 
Congressional agenda at time t+1, the second Congress after the Presidential election. The 
models are as follows: 
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First Congress after the Presidential election (t): 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎'( = 𝛼' + 	𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎'(-. + 	𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚'( + 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑋𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑'(+ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚'( + 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑(	𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒'( + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒'(-. + 	𝜀'(	 
Second Congress after the Presidential election (t+1) 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎'(A. = 𝛼' + 	𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎'( + 	𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚'(A. + 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑋𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑'(A.+ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚'(A. + 	𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑋𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑'(A.+ 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑(A.	𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒'(A. + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒'( + 	𝜀'(A. 
 
Dependent Variables: Congressional Policymaking Attention to Lawmaking and Oversight 
 
 I report models with three different dependent variables representing Congressional 
policymaking attention to policy issues. The first two represent attention to lawmaking. The first 
model uses the percent of attention to each policy issue in roll call votes from 1948-2014. Roll 
call votes are familiar to political scientists who study Congress, and represent the chamber 
floor’s decision to devote scarce floor time to a priority. The second model uses the percent of 
referral hearings devoted to the issue from 1948-2014. Referral hearings are defined by the 
Policy Agendas Project as any hearing where a bill is considered. These hearings also represent a 
scarce resource, although a different kind of one from roll call votes. Hearings require intensive 
work from committee staff and members, but are not constrained by the floor’s limited agenda. 
Much of the legislation outputted by committees passes through the floor of Congress by voice 
vote or without objection with no roll call vote recorded. We should expect these two processes 
to function similarly, as they both involve changing the laws of the United States, but with some 
key differences. Roll call votes will generally be more contentious, and may involve position-
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taking on laws that do not end up passing. Parties may prefer to use roll call votes to highlight 
the priorities promised in their platforms 
The final dependent variable, which represents attention to oversight policymaking, is the 
percentage of Congressional non-legislative hearings devoted to each issue. These hearings are 
the primary venue through which Congress directs oversight attention (Baumgartner and Jones 
2016; Bawn 1997; Lewallen 2016; Workman 2015). Congress has held more non-legislative 
hearings and fewer referral hearings as the federal bureaucracy has grown (Lewallen 2016; 
Jones, Whyman and Theriault, forthcoming). When Congressional attention lurches to a different 
policy area, we can expect them to devote a larger proportion of non-legislative hearings to that 
policy area.  
 
Independent Variable: Party Platform Attention 
 
 Every four years, the American political parties release platforms stating their policy 
priorities if elected to office. If party agendas influence legislative agendas, we should see a 
response in legislative outputs following the shock of a new party platform in the subsequent 
Congress. To measure the party agenda, I include data on the policy content of U.S. party 
platforms. Data is coded at the quasi-sentence level, then aggregated yearly. These data were 
originally collected by Christina Wolbrecht (see Wolbrecht and Hartney 2014), and are now 
maintained by the Policy Agendas Project.3 I include the percent of policy attention to each issue 
topic in the platform of both the majority and minority parties in the previous election.  
                                                
3	Christina	Wolbrecht,	American	Political	Party	Platforms:	1948-2008.	These	data	are	made	
possible	in	part	by	support	from	the	Institute	for	Scholarship	in	the	Liberal	Arts,	College	of	Arts	
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Independent Variable: Unified Government 
 
 Presidents are more successful at agenda setting with co-partisans (Beckman 2010). 
Thus, we should expect the effect of party platforms to be stronger under unified government 
than divided government. I included a dummy variable which is coded as a 1 when the 
government is unified under one party and 0 when there is divided government, and interacted it 
with both the platform of the party of the President and the losing party.  
 
Independent Variable: Problem Space 
 
 The problem space is a difficult concept to operationalize. Policy problems bubble up to 
the surface and demand the attention of policymakers, often with little notice. Problems can arise 
both exogenously and within government (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). If policymakers fail to 
address a problem, voters may hold them accountable (Adler and Wilkerson 2012). Many of 
these problems are quickly dealt with by policy subsystems. However, many are not, and macro 
political actors such as Congress are forced to confront them (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). 
Some issues are dealt with before they become salient in the mass public; others rise to become 
highly salient and mobilizing issues. To measure changes in the problem space, I included 
average responses to Gallup’s Most Important Problem (MIP) question. MIP is often used to 
measure the prominence or salience of policy problems to the mass public (Wlezien 2005; Jones 
                                                                                                                                                       
&	Letters,	University	of	Notre	Dame.	Neither	ISLA	nor	the	original	collectors	of	the	data	bear	
any	responsibility	for	the	analysis	reported	here.	
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and Baumgartner 2005; Jones, Larsen-Smith and Wilkerson 2009).  As problems become more 
severe, a higher proportion of respondents will declare a particular issue the most important 
problem facing the country. MIP tends to be dominated by macroeconomic issues and war (see 
Table 1). MIP is clearly an imperfect operationalization of the problem space, but functions as a 
useful proxy for problem severity among the mass public that can be measured over a time 
period spanning six decades.  
 
Results 
 
Table 2 displays the results of the model during the first Congress after the Presidential 
election. These results vary by type of agenda, but overall support for the Lawmaking 
Hypothesis. As issue emphasis platform of the President increases, Congress tends to hold more 
roll call votes on that issue. The effect is positive and statistically significant under divided 
government (p=0.015), while slightly smaller under periods of unified government (p=0.095). 
These effects are quite similar, indicating that the agenda setting relationship between the 
platform of the President’s party and roll calls is not conditioned on divided government. Issues 
emphasized in the party out of the White House’s platform are no more or less emphasized by 
Congress. This relationship works slightly differently under referral hearings. There is a strong 
and significant relationship between the President’s platform and referral hearings under unified 
governments (p<.001), but not under divided governments (p=0.160). There is also a negative 
and significant relationship between issue attention in the platform of the party out of the White 
House and referral hearings under both divided (p=0.090) and unified (p=0.011) governments. 
Lawmaking through roll call votes and referral hearings appears to function differently under 
divided and unified government.  
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We see a slightly different but generally consistent pattern for oversight attention in the 
first Congress after the election. Under unified government, there is a positive and significant 
(p=0.050) relationship between issue attention in the platform of the President’s party and non-
referral hearings in Congress. Under divided government, there is no significant relationship (p-
0.325). There is no significant relationship between the losing party’s platform and oversight 
attention, although the coefficient is negative under unified government (p=0.268). There is little 
evidence to support the oversight hypothesis; the effect of platform attention on attention to 
policy in referral and oversight hearings is not significantly different under either unified or 
divided government.  
What explains the different processes for attention to policy for referral hearings and roll 
call votes? Both processes are performing a fundamentally similar function in considering 
changes to laws. Roll call votes highlight political conflict, while referral hearings are often held 
on bills that pass Congress through a voice vote or by unanimous consent. It may be the case that 
parties in power under unified government are less likely to force votes that highlight political 
conflict, and are more willing to enact their expressed priorities on less controversial legislation.  
The results change when the dependent variable changes to the agenda of the second 
Congress after the Presidential election (see Table 3). There is no significant relationship 
between roll call votes and the platform of the party holding the Presidency under either divided 
or unified government. However, there is a positive and significant (p=0.046) relationship 
between issues emphasized in the losing party’s platform and Congress under unified 
government. This result is surprising, as the party in power in these cases holds neither the White 
House nor either chamber of Congress, and saw their issue priorities deemphasized in the prior 
Congress. In the referral hearing model, Congress holds fewer hearings on issues emphasized by 
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the platform of the President’s party under both divided (p=0.026) and unified (p=0.08) 
government, and more on issues emphasized by losing party’s platform under divided 
government (p=0.083). While many of these results are not significant at a 0.05 threshold, they 
suggest that referral hearings in the second Congress after the Presidential election follow similar 
pattern as roll call hearings. In the oversight model, no platforms are significant at even a 0.1 
threshold. 
How do we explain these surprising results? The literature may point to two explanations. 
First, they may be caused by disproportionate information processing (Jones and Baumgartner 
2005). When policymakers allocate scarce resources toward a priority, they must neglect other 
priorities. Eventually, they are forced to address those issues, as ignore problems bubble up to 
the surface. Thus, party platforms may have little to no long run effect on the agenda, but can 
change priorities in the short term. Second, the party in the opposition may be able to push the 
agenda toward their issues, as Green-Pederson and Mortenson (2010) observed in their study of 
Danish agendas. The opposition may also gain strength after the mid-term elections.  
Finally, Congress is responsive to changes in the problem space. The coefficient on MIP 
is positive and significant for both roll call votes and non-referral hearings during first Congress, 
and for roll call votes after the second. Interestingly, effect size on MIP is more than twice as 
large in the second and significant (p<.001). With the previous election deep in the past, 
policymakers appear to be using their most visible agendas (roll call votes) to address current 
problems, rather than the problems they promised to emphasize in the last platform, in 
anticipation of the next election. 
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Table	2:	Effect	of	the	Platforms	of	the	President's	Party	on	Congress,	
First	Congress	After	the	Presidential	Election	(t)	
Independent	Variables	 DV:	Roll	Callst	
DV:	
Referral	
Hearingst	
DV:	Non-
Referral	
Hearingst	
Lagged	DVt-1	 0.55***	 0.90***	 0.75***	
	
(0.06)	 (0.04)	 (0.04)	
Winning	Platformt	 0.19*	 0.07	 0.07	
	
(0.08)	 (0.05)	 (0.07)	
Platformt	x	Unifiedt	 0.12+	 0.15***	 0.13+	
	
(0.07)	 (0.04)	 (0.07)	
Losing	Platformt	 -0.002	 -0.07+	 0.04	
	
(0.08)	 (0.04)	 (0.07)	
Losing	Platformt	X	Unifiedt	 0.02	 -0.09*	 -0.07	
	
(0.07)	 (0.04)	 (0.06)	
Unifiedt	 0.003	 -0.003	 0.001	
	
(0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	
Most	Important	Problemt	 0.07*	 0.03	 0.06*	
	
(0.03)	 (0.02)	 (0.03)	
Most	Important	Problemt-1	 -0.07*	 -0.04*	 -0.06+	
	
(0.03)	 (0.02)	 (0.03)	
r2	 0.63	 0.85	 0.68	
n	 323	 323	 323	
Wald	chi2	 368.93	 716.52	 629.08	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	***	p<.001	**	p<.01	*	p<.05.	All	
models	use	panel	corrected	standard	errors.		
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Table	3:	Effect	of	the	Platforms	of	the	President's	Party	on	Congress,	
Second	Congress	After	the	Presidential	Election	(t+1)	
Independent	Variables	 DV:	Roll	Callst+1	
DV:	
Referral	
Hearingst+1	
DV:	Non-
Referral	
Hearingst+1	
Lagged	DVt	 0.79***	 0.93***	 0.86***	
	
(0.07)	 (0.05)	 (0.05)	
Winning	Platformt	 -.01	 -0.09*	 -0.12	
	
(0.07)	 (0.04)	 (0.08)	
Platformt	x	Unifiedt+1	 -0.08	 -0.12+	 0.02	
	
(0.10)	 (0.07)	 (0.08)	
Losing	Platformt-1	 -0.02	 0.07+	 0.12	
	
(0.06)	 (0.04)	 (0.07)	
Losing	Platformt-1	X	Unifiedt+1	 0.17*	 0.06	 0.06	
	
(0.08)	 (0.05)	 (0.06)	
Unifiedt+1	 -0.01**	 0.001	 -0.004	
	
(0.02)	 (0.002)	 (0.003)	
Most	Important	Problemt+1	 0.16***	 0.02	 0.003	
	
(0.03)	 (0.02)	 (0.03)	
Most	Important	Problemt	 -0.12***	 0.002	 0.003	
	
(0.002)	 (0.02)	 (0.03)	
r2	 0.67	 0.84	 0.72	
n	 304	 304	 304	
Wald	chi2	 404.33	 428.93	 516.34	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	***	p<.001	**	p<.01	*	p<.05.	All	models	
use	panel	corrected	standard	errors.	N=304	instead	of	323	as	data	is	not	
yet	available	for	the	114th	Congress	(2015-2016).		
 
 
We can also observe some interesting cross-sectional variation across issues. Figure 1 
plots roll call attention against attention in the platform of the President. On many issues, such as 
energy and defense, the two series tend to track each other. However, there are notable 
exceptions. International Affairs and Macroeconomics do not follow party platforms. On both 
issues, Congress has a narrower role than on other issues. For international affairs, the President 
tends to set policy. For macroeconomics, actors such as the federal reserve often ultimately make 
policy. We see similar patterns on referral hearings, but also see the importance public lands 
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policy, which makes up just 3.7% of platforms but 16.2% of referral hearings. Public lands is one 
of the least polarized issue areas (Jones and Jochim 2013); Congress may be able to move 
through the committee process on public lands bills with lower levels of conflicts than other 
issues. These cross-sectional differences by issue deserve further study. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Attention to Issues in Platform of President’s Party and Roll Call Votes 
 
 
Source: Policy Agendas Project and Wolbrecht (2016) 
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Figure 2: Attention to Issues in Platform of President’s Party and Referral Hearings 
 
Source: Policy Agendas Project and Wolbrecht (2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.1
.2
.3
0
.1
.2
.3
0
.1
.2
.3
0
.1
.2
.3
0
.1
.2
.3
0
.1
.2
.3
0
.1
.2
.3
0
.1
.2
.3
80 90 100 110 80 90 100 110 120 80 90 100 110 120 80 90 100 110 120 80 90 100 110 120
80 90 100 110
80 90 100 110 80 90 100 110 80 90 100 110 80 90 100 110
Agriculture Civil Rights Commerce and Finance Defense Education
Energy Environment Health Care Housing Immigration
International Affairs Labor Law and Crime Macroeconomics Public Lands
Science & Communication Social Welfare Trade Transportation
Percent of Referral Hearings Perecent of Platform
Congress
 21 
Figure 3: Attention to Issues in Platform of President’s Party and Non-Referral Hearings 
 
Source: Policy Agendas Project and Wolbrecht (2016) 
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Conclusions 
 
 This paper offers two key contributions to the literature on agenda setting and legislative 
behavior. First, it found that the elected officials do indeed follow through on the priorities 
promised in the platform of the party of the President. Voters can observe emphasized issues 
during in the platform during the campaign and expect the party who wins the Presidency to shift 
the government’s attention toward those issues. Previous work has suggested that the majority 
party often is forced to respond to new problems, rather than prioritizing issues emphasized in 
the campaign (Green-Pederson and Mortenson 2010; Froio, Bevan and Jennings 2016; Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005). The results presented here suggest both that parties can indeed influence the 
legislative agenda while other factors do as well.  
However, they can only influence the agenda in the short run. The effect of platform 
attention on the Congressional agenda fades after the first Congress after the platform is issued, 
and in some cases, becomes negative and significant. It theorized that two processes contributed 
to the short run-long run differences in platform agenda setting. First, the information 
contributed to the policy process by party platforms fades quickly, requiring policymakers to 
respond to new information in the problem space. Second, policymakers are forced to increase 
attention to underemphasized immediately after devoting disproportionate attention to those 
policies. Both mechanisms are interesting on their own, and deserve further study. 
 Finally, the relationship between issues emphasized in the platform of the President’s 
party and the Congressional agenda also varies by instrument and by issue. Congress holds more 
roll call votes under divided government on issues emphasized by the President’s platform, but 
not under unified government. The opposite is true of referral hearings. Contrary to expectations, 
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there is some weak evidence that oversight attention also increases following platform attention. 
Domestic policy issues tend to have a stronger relationship with the platform than international 
affairs, especially on roll call votes.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix	Table	1:	Effect	of	the	Platforms	of	the	President's	Party	on	
Congress,	First	Congress	After	the	Presidential	Election	(t),	
Government	Operations	Included	
Independent	Variables	 DV:	Roll	Callst	
DV:	
Referral	
Hearingst	
DV:	Non-
Referral	
Hearingst	
Lagged	DVt-1	 0.90***	 0.89***	 0.92***	
	
(0.05)	 (0.03)	 (0.05)	
Winning	Platformt	 -0.03	 0.06	 -0.07	
	
(0.09)	 (0.05)	 (0.09)	
Platformt	x	Unifiedt	 0.01	 0.10*	 0.04	
	
(0.09)	 (0.05)	 (0.07)	
Losing	Platformt	 0.07	 -0.06	 0.14	
	
(0.09)	 (0.05)	 (0.09)	
Losing	Platformt	X	Unifiedt	 -0.02	 -0.05	 -0.03	
	
(0.08)	 (0.04)	 (0.07)	
Unifiedt	 0.002	 -0.002	 0.003	
	
(0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.002	
Most	Important	Problemt	 0.12***	 0.03	 0.06*	
	
(0.04)	 (0.02)	 (0.03)	
Most	Important	Problemt-1	 -0.12**	 -0.04*	 -0.06	
	
(0.04)	 (0.02)	 (0.03)	
r2	 0.80	 0.87	 0.77	
n	 340	 340	 340	
Wald	chi2	 574	 766	 605	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	***	p<.001	**	p<.01	*	p<.05.	All	
models	use	panel	corrected	standard	errors.		
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Appendix	Table	2:	Effect	of	the	Platforms	of	the	President's	Party	on	
Congress,	Second	Congress	After	the	Presidential	Election	(t+1),	
Government	Operations	Included	
Independent	Variables	 DV:	Roll	Callst+1	
DV:	
Referral	
Hearingst+1	
DV:	Non-
Referral	
Hearingst+1	
Lagged	DVt	 0.89***	 0.95***	 0.83***	
	
(0.04)	 (0.04)	 (0.03)	
Winning	Platformt	 -0.01	 -0.11*	 -0.08	
	
(0.07)	 (0.04)	 (0.08)	
Platformt	x	Unifiedt+1	 -0.15	 -0.23**	 0.04	
	
(0.11)	 (0.07)	 (0.07)	
Losing	Platformt-1	 -0.06	 0.08*	 0.11	
	
(0.07)	 (0.04)	 (0.07)	
Losing	Platformt-1	X	Unifiedt+1	 0.20*	 0.15*	 0.06	
	
(0.09)	 (0.06)	 (0.06)	
Unifiedt+1	 -0.007*	 0.003	 -0.003	
	
(0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	
Most	Important	Problemt+1	 0.16***	 0.02	 0.003	
	
(0.03)	 (0.02)	 (0.03)	
Most	Important	Problemt	 -0.12***	 -0.003	 0.0001	
	
(0.03)	 (0.02)	 (0.03)	
r2	 0.83	 0.87	 0.81	
n	 320	 320	 320	
Wald	chi2	 923	 652	 979	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	***	p<.001	**	p<.01	*	p<.05.	All	models	
use	panel	corrected	standard	errors.	N=320	instead	of	340	as	data	is	not	
yet	available	for	the	114th	Congress	(2015-2016).		
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